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IN THE SUPREME CQU,RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. JOHNSON, 
Plaint~ff and A ppelloot, 
vs. 
ROBERT CRAIL, H E N R Y M. 
SCHEURN and DANIEL S. 
BUSHNELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REPLY OF APPELLANT. 
Case No. 9291 
Comes now the Ap·pellant and here rep-lies to Points 
II, III and IV of Respondents' Brief. 
STATEMENT OF P:OIN·TiS 
POINT I 
RE:SPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT APPELLANT 
CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE THAT ISSUANCE OF THE 
STO'CK WAS. NOT AN "ISOL.NTED TRANSACTION" O·N 
APPEAL IS IN ERROR. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT TRANiSACTION 
WAS EXEMPT AS AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPOR.A:TION 
IS IN ERROR AND IS NOT A PRO·PER SUBJECT FOR THIS 
APPEAL. 
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2 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT CAN-
NO'T QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTO·RY CAUSE OF 
ACTION IS SPECIOUS, IN ERROR, AND NOT A PROPER 
SUBJECT FOR THIS APPEAL. 
POINT IV 
THE STIPULATIONS ENTERED INTO AND AP-
PROVED BY T·HE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING UPON 
THE RESPONDENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RE1SPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT APPELLANT 
CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE THAT ISSUANCE OF THE 
STOCK W A8 NOT AN "ISOLATED TRANSACTION" O·N 
APPEAL IS IN ERRO·R. 
In Respondents' Point II, we are told that Appellant 
has raised the issue of whe,ther the complained of trans-
action was "an isolated transaction'' for the first time 
on app·e.al. This is not the fact. 
·The order of the District Court dismissing Appel-
lant's Se-cond c~ause of Action, which order is the subject 
of this appeal, was pursuant to motion of defendants, 
and by its terms was based upon consideration of briefs 
suhmit'ted to the respective p;arties. In the plaintiff's 
reply brief, there fil·ed, the issue of ''an isolated trans-
action"' was argued. 
As to that portio~ of the pre-trial order dated Sep-
tember 28, 1959, (R. 9) (Respondents' Brief P. 16), 
counsel for appell'ant moved. t~e ·C:ourt on .O.ctober 12, 
1959 that said p~aragraph he stricken ''pursuant. to the 
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3 
provisions of 61-1-22, U.C.A. 1953." (R. 13) This motion 
was denied 0 1ciober 22, 1959. (R. 14) The motion was 
again raised· at subsequent pre-trial and taken under 
advisen1ent (R. 23), but has never been acted upon ex-
cept by implication in the eou:rts pre-trial order dated 
April25, 1960 (R. 25) and the order of dismissal ap·pealed 
from (R. 27). 
Section 61-1-22, U;C.A., 1953, p·rovides, ''It 
shall not be necessary to negative any of the 
exemptions or classifications in this ·chapter pro-
vided in any complaint, information or indictment 
or in any writ or p~roceedings laid ·or brought 
under this cha!lter, and the burden of proof of 
any such exemption shall be up~on the pa.rty clavm-
~ng the benefit of such exemption or classvf~ca­
tiJon. '' ( emph·asis added) 
·This being the law, it did nort appear equitable to impose 
U!lOn plaintiff the limitations of the paragraph eom-
plained of. 
However, even if th.e objectionable paragraph is 
pernritted to stand, it does not by its language dep·rive 
the Appellant of the issue of "isolated transaction." 
In the Statement of the ·Case stipulated to by all of 
the parties to this appeal, tSupplemental Record, filed 
September 27, 19·60, Page 1), it is stipulated as. follows: 
''Deeds of ·conveyance were received from 
Empire Mining ·Company, an Iowa Corporation, 
and W. D. Johnson, in ·consideration for whieh 
40,000 shares. of said stock were; issued to W. D. 
Johnson, the plainrtiff. Bills of sale were received 
from Fred B. Grube and Grube Harman Mining 
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Company, a partnership, for which 20,000 shares 
of said stock were issued to Fred B. Grube.'' . 
In the objectionable p~aragraph in the pre-trial order, the 
trial ·court merely brands these two issues of stock as 
"a single transaction". The cases cited on Page 12 of 
Appellant's original Brief support the proposition that 
''an isolated sale means one standing alone, disconnected 
from any other.'' The language of the paragraph in 
the p,re-tri'al order compels a -conclusion on the part of 
the plaintiff that the issue of 40,000 shares of stock to 
W. D. Johnson was not "an isolated transaction". If 
the Respondents desired to make thaJt claim the burden 
was upon them to prove it under 16-1-22, U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT TRANSACTION 
WAS EXEMPT AS AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPORATION 
IS IN ERROR AND IS NOT A PRO-PER SUBJECT FOR THIS 
APPEAL. 
Res~pondents urge in Point Ill of their Brief that 
the sale· of 40,000 shares of stock to W. D. Johnson was 
exempt for ,th·e re.ason that it was a sale to a corporation. 
The.y eite tJl~ trial court's memorandum "Decision" 
(Sup:plemental Record filed November 4, 1960) as though 
it were conclusive. on this ·factual question and binding 
on this Court. 
/The trial court made 'and entered this memorandum 
after· hearing evidence as to whether the plaintiff was 
the real p:arty in interest on the plaintiff's F~rst ·Cause 
of Action. The court severely curtailed what evidence 
it would hear from the· plaintiff at that time 'and as 
' 
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it pointed out in its memorandwn, the plaintiff ''pro-
duced no evidence of being authorized to take title in 
himself for the stock.'' This queS'tion was not fully ex-
plored. There vvas no reason for requiring further evi-
dence on that subject, since defendants themselves pre-
pared and issued to the plaintiff herein the s.tock certifi-
cates in question. If the issu~ance of them to this plaintiff 
was not p.roper, it was incumbent upon defendants to 
so show, they having the burden. 
Pursuant to this memorandum ''decision'' the re-
spondents prepared, and caused to be signed and entered, 
Findings of Fa.ct, ('Sup·plemental Record filed Nov. 4, 
1960), the 6th p·aragraph of which stated in part ''At 
the time of tha alleged restitution or commencement of 
this action, the plaintiff was not the owner of the stock 
received from Prudential Oil & Minerals Company.'' To 
this finding the plaintiff objected, and upon motion of 
plaintiff the entire paragraph was stricken from the 
findings of fact, and the trial court ''s judgment there 
was confined strictly to the issues of the Plaintiff's 
First Cause of Action (general fraud), and the neeessary 
facts incident thereto, not to the second cause, now before 
this court. 
The Appellant is entitled to his day in court in order 
to determine, among other things, the fact of ownership 
of said 40,000 shares of Prudential stock, under said 
second cause of action. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT CAN-
NOT QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTORY CAU1SE OF 
ACTION IS SPECIOU·S, IN ERROR, AND NOT A PROPER 
SUBJECT FOR THI~S APPEAL. 
Res·pondents' argument under Point III of their 
brief is somewhat comparable to the argument of the 
man who was conv~cted of murdering his mother and 
father, but urged the court to have mercy on him since 
he was an orphan. 
That respondents' received valuable eonsideration 
for the 40,000 shares of Prudential stock is not denied. 
Whether the consideration came from the plaintiff di-
rectly or in part from some one else in his behalf, is of 
no moment, and may be decided by the trial court. The 
sole, material inquiry is, who received the stock and 
who possess.ed it at the time of the commencement of 
this aJction, all certificates running in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
A condition precedent to recovery under 61-1-25, 
U.~c·.A., 1953, is the· tender back to the seller of the stock. 
Only the recipient of the stock, in posse-ssion of the 
stock, ~could make such a tender. ~See Prudential Oil & M. 
Co., :CraiJl & Scheurn vs. Haml~~, (1960) 277 Fed. 2d, 
384, 387 and Rule 17 (a), U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT IV. 
THE STIPULATIONS ENTERED INTO AND AP-
PROVED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING UPON 
THE RESPONDENTS. 
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The '~statement of the Case" stipulated to by the 
parties and approved by the trial court is binding upon 
the respondents. Said stipulated facts clearly state that, 
(1) the appellant executed a deed of conveyance in part 
consideration for the sale of the 40,000 shares of Pru-
dential stock and (2) the said 40,000 shares of stock 
were issued to the appellant. Respondents can not now 
be heard to urge a contrary portion of a "memorandum 
decision" which was in existence at the time of said stipu-
lation in order to defeat that stipulation. Points III and 
IV of Respondents' Brief are improper argument, out of 
order and not proper subjects for this appeal. See 50 Am. 
Jur., p. 612 and Pasco Holding Company v. Wells, 126 
Fla. 339 171, So. 67 4. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully refer to page 13 of our main brief, 
under the heading ''·Conclusion''. 
The issue of this appe·al is joined in Point I of Appel-
lant's brief and Point I of Respondents' brief. The 
remainder of the points raised and argued by respond-
ents are without merit, and can only serve to confuse 
and mislead. The letters of the Attorney General do 
not treat the points in issue in this cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAMON M. ·C·HILD and 
SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
·Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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